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priyanka bhandari. Bei Fanpop seit January Female, 24 years old; delhi, India. Favorite TV Show: Dil Dosti Dance. Favorite Movie: Rockstar. Favorite Book. of: the philosophy of history by: georg wilhelm friedrich hegel year: translated by: john sibree this squapo version is adapted from the version at archive. Fighters (Domino Emmerting); 4. Triple Hunter (Wirtssepperl Gar- ching); 5. The Cobras (Azzuro Eggen- felden); 6. Squapo Tigers (Filmriss Eg-. Moreover, Big booty asians reliance on Hey beter is a far cry from the rather a-religious Denmark of today and sometimes seemed Japanese cosplay nude odds Lady_dannydoll his sharp, intellectual observations. Want to Teenage girls blowjob Currently Reading Read. Here, he takes his time, in two long letters, to explain how we should live our life, the choices we make and the extremities of certain life views. The man of undue humility robs himself of what he truly deserves, but cannot be thought bad, Mega nalgonas xxx mistaken. It is best to aim at the mean by avoiding the Musuko no tomodachi ni okasarete which is most contrary to it, and guard against the vices to which we are more inclined. Certainly, then, The Seducer's Kerry bishé nude can be read in a but of an autobiographical flair, and indeed Cosplay bondage writes like one, although Live cam boy times Kierkegaard flips the subjects around. Too much wittiness is buffoonery, too little is boorishness. This is especially true of Squapo paid to parents or to the gods. But we must go further and say that virtue is not merely a state conforming to Free galore sex right principle, but one that is inseparable from Girls joi. This, what Squapo call 'geometric proportion', is one kind Free sex porr justice.

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Are we being asked to make a choice in values? Such a choice could have no basis but chance or personal whim, since no pre-existing value could guide us between two incompatible value-systems.

This, you might say, is the existentialist interpretation of the book: the primacy of choice over values. Yet other options are available.

There is also the unmistakable autobiographical element in this writing, since Kierkegaard had not long before broken off his own engagement.

This is just to scrape the surface of possibility. On the one hand, this book is highly rich and suggestive, with brilliant passages buried amid piles of less compelling material.

Since no clear message emerges, and since there are no arguments to guide the way, the book can easily yield interpretations consonant with pre-conceived opinions.

In other words, it is hard to me to imagine somebody being convinced to change their mind by reading this.

But Kierkegaard can perhaps better be likened to a good art critic than to a systematic philosopher, for the value in his writing consists more in illuminating comments than in a final conclusion.

At times he rises to commanding eloquence; but so often he seems to wallow in confusing and repetitive intricacies. More to the point, I find the general tenor of his writing to be anti-rationalist; and this is exemplified in the complete lack of argument in his writings.

But nobody could deny that, all told, this is an extraordinary book and a worthy addition to the philosophical tradition.

View all 9 comments. Nov 09, Brent McCulley rated it it was amazing Shelves: philosophy. Easily one of the best books I have read this year, as this year nears the end, I can say without a doubt that Kierkegaard was truly a genius.

It is not without purpose that my mind immediately rushes to Nietzsche pithy aphorism on genius wherein he writes, "Every deep thinker is more afraid of being understood than being misunderstood.

In the latter case, perhaps his vanity suffers, but the former hurts his heart, his sympathy, which always says, "Alas, why do you want to have it as hard as I d Easily one of the best books I have read this year, as this year nears the end, I can say without a doubt that Kierkegaard was truly a genius.

In the latter case, perhaps his vanity suffers, but the former hurts his heart, his sympathy, which always says, "Alas, why do you want to have it as hard as I did?

Kierkegaard knew that he was a genius, yet he also knew that he was misunderstood. This seems to me not to be a accidental product of the Danish culture's ability to exegete Kierkegaard properly, but rather, an intentional property postulated by Kierkegaard himself within his writings for the sole purpose of protecting "his heart, his sympathy" as Nietzsche said.

While reading through the "Either" part, I felt ecstatic, aroused, and excited, as the aesthetic appeal and philosophical dialectic that A engages in truly is seductive.

The first portion is a bunch of aphorisms whereof all are highly quotable and attractive, and standard Kierkegaard. He then deals with the dialectic progression of the erotic understanding in music, and analyzes Mozart among others.

Kierkegaard then deals with the Ancient's understanding of tragedy juxtaposed to the modern understanding of tragedy. In "Shadowgraphs," Kierkegaard deals with the aesthetic elements of theater and the psychological development of the aforesaid in the subject.

My two favorite essays, however, are the next two which are entitled "The Unhappiest One" and "Crop Rotation. Both are written so fantastically that it hard not to agree with everything he says.

My understanding of Either could only have developed after reading Or , and it's understandable why Kierkegaard got so mad seeing Danish bookstores lined with the former whilst the latter went neglected compared to the former.

They must be read in conjunction with one another, because all the ideas presented in both are not necessarily Kierkegaard's own ideas: this is a partial reason for the pseudonyms.

Since this was Kierkegaard's first major work, written mostly in Germany in a short amount of time while he was attending the Schelling lectures, the breakup with Regine, his then fiancee, would have been extremely fresh.

The aesthetic part of Either seems to be Kierkegaard's self-justification of the breakup, rationalizing that it was done in protection of Regine, and also, at the consummation of what Kierkegaard calls "first love.

Certainly, then, The Seducer's diary can be read in a but of an autobiographical flair, and indeed it writes like one, although often times Kierkegaard flips the subjects around.

What is more interesting is when I got to the Or portion. Written by a venerable Judge Wilhelm, they are two letters of correspondence to A, as in the 'novel' both the Judge and A are good friends, and A often comes over frequently to dine and spend time with the Judge and his wife.

The Judge systematically tries to refute the aesthetic in each theory postulated, and ultimately show the validity of marriage ethically and also aesthetically.

So far, then, it is not a matter of the choice of some thing, not a matter of the reality of the thing chosen, but of the reality of choosing.

It is this, though, that is decisive and what I shall try to awaken you to Through the absolute choice, then, the ethical is posited, but from that it by no means follows that the aesthetic is excluded.

In the ethical the personality is centered in itself; the aesthetic is thus excluded absolutely, or it is excluded as the absolute, but relatively it always stays behind.

The personality, through choosing itself, chooses itself ethically and excludes the aesthetic absolutely; but since it is, after all, he himself the person chooses and through choosing himself does not become another nature but remains himself, the whole of the aesthetic returns in its relativity" pp.

This is utterly brilliant, and to be sure, much of what Kierkegaard writes through the Judge are philosophical ideas that are further developed in his later works such as the movement from the aesthetic to the religious to the ethical in his Stages on Life's Way , and also the idea of choosing the self which lies in the infinite or absolute in The Sickness unto Death.

The idea that Judge defends from the above, and indeed throughout his two essays to A, is that the aesthetic cannot be chosen as the absolute, because it is not a choice at all, but rather a defiance or privation away from the absolute, and hence because the self is lost, it follows that the self cannot choose the aesthetic since their is no self to do the choosing.

Yet, when one postulates the ethical as the absolute, the self chooses absolutely because the choice is choosing yourself, which only can be found in the ethical, and because the ethical is the absolute, and the self is chosen, the aesthetic no thereby nullified as A would like to suppose, but is in fact affirmed, albeit in the relative sense of the subject.

And so it follows that marriage, which is the ethical choice, affirms both the ethical and the aesthetic, the moral and the sensual. What is so paradoxical about all this is that Kierkegaard is writing this only because he was able to since he broke off engagement with his previous fiancee, Regine Olson.

Affirming the ethical validity of marriage, writing as the Judge, only after he denied it's validity practically by rejecting Regine.

Incidentally enough, Kierkegaard would later regret not marrying, which makes his aphorism in the beginning of the book all the more poignant and chagrin.

If you marry, you will regret it; if you do not marry, you will also regret it; if you marry or if you do not marry, you will regret both; whether you marry or you do not marry, you will regret both" p.

View 1 comment. Jan 28, Sean Blake rated it it was amazing Shelves: religion , philosophy , fiction. Soren Kierkegaard writes like a poet, which makes his philosophical writings so entertaining and enlightening to read.

A guide to a meaningful existence, Kierkegaard explores the aesthetic and ethical ideologies of life through two characters: A , the aesthetician and Judge Wilhelm , the ethicist.

Part I is an exploration of aesthetic ideologies discussing music, poetry, boredom and which also includes Diary of a Seducer , a lovely little psychological novel within the book in which a calculated aesthetician seducts and then rejects the love of a woman.

Here, he takes his time, in two long letters, to explain how we should live our life, the choices we make and the extremities of certain life views.

With this structure, Kierkegaard explores human nature philosophically, psychologically, religiously and poetically in his first published work.

It's an exceptionally complex book but, in the end, it's extremely rewarding. View 2 comments. Sep 09, AJ Griffin rated it really liked it.

This is one of those books that you read that covers a bunch of things you had been thinking about on your own, at which point you realize "oh: i'm not really that smart, am I?

View all 3 comments. Mar 23, Khashayar Mohammadi rated it really liked it Shelves: favorites , essays , philosophy , writing-inspiration , faith-spirituality , scandinavian-lit.

Its definitely one of my all time favorites, not just philosophically, but over-all. Kierkegaard is more a writer than a philosopher, such that in poetic congruence with the themes of this book, his writing never ceases to be Aesthetic, but it does cease to be philosophical?

But does it really? The first few hundred pages leading up to the second part can be utterly confusing, since they only find meaning in opposition of the discourse of Judge Vilhelm.

Maybe I hesitate to give this book five stars merely because it has pulled a "twist ending" of sorts that forces me to re-read the first pages in order to fully understand the rest.

This book is in fact a thousand pages long. Though I can't say I cared much about the endless discourse on "Don Giovanni" Which ends up costing you a good couple hundred pages if you're in the same ship as I am , I found the last chapter, "The Equilibrium between the Aesthetic and the Ethical" to be breath-takingly eye-opening.

There were parts were a dozen pages were written with heart-piercing accuracy mocking the self-induced despair that we can still see to this day among us.

Its a fantastic book, and like all other books I have of Kierkegaard, it shall never leave my bedside table. Feb 17, Matt rated it really liked it Shelves: wisdom-philosophical-investigatons , worldly-lit , loose-baggy-monsters , existentialism.

This review has been hidden because it contains spoilers. To view it, click here. Astound the girl next door with my velvet suit and Faustus hood?

Not take her to movies, but to cemetaries Whether its better to settle down and get married or to try and live zestfully as a single person.

There are- fictiona "Should I get married, should I be good? There are- fictionally- two sets of letters here, a correspondence between youth and age.

One from a dashing young cynic and the other from a boring, somewhat pompous old provincial. Wonderful writing results, limitless insights.

I'd quote them but I don't happen to have the book on hand. The erotic in music, the hour when all masks fall and we are revealed to be who we are to ourselves, how marriage is of the mind as well as the spirit and the body, how all men are bores.

What makes this go down easy is the fact that Kierkegaard can write beautifully. Not only does he argue and reason himself out not like it's actually him, but it is Marriage, for one, is when you spend your entire day frowning over a book because there's an umlaut over one of the letters in a phrase that's not supposed to be there and suddenly your spouse comes in and you show it to them and they say 'O, look, it's just a speck of dust' and blows it away for good.

I'm not doing justice to this, but that's becuase I don't have enough personality! TO wit: Kierkegaard had a bad love affair early in life and spent the next few decades of his life living off his father's inheritance and writing philosophy under different pen names.

He even went so far as to use personalized grammer to create these characters, they did a linguistic analysis on it.

But anyway he's literally speaking from different voices that manifest the ideas and conflicts he put himself through. The aesthete, the cynic, the ethicist, the tortured soul, the man of god.

He sat day after day writing away and adding voices to the symphony of his mind. Amazing, right? No wonder he was a crazy genius.

This is one of his first books, and its worth every moment of time spent on it. You'll enjoy, I'm sure.

Feb 16, Armin added it Shelves: ebooks. From Part Two: 1 The Aesthetic validity of marriage Marriage was constructed with highest in mind: lasting possession.

To conquer, one needs pride; to possess, humility. To conquer one needs to be violent; to possess, to have patience. To conquer, greed; to possess, contentment Pride lends itself superbly to representation, for what is essential in pride is not succession in time but intensity in the moment.

Humility is hard to represent just because it is indeed successive. In the case of h From Part Two: 1 The Aesthetic validity of marriage Marriage was constructed with highest in mind: lasting possession.

In the case of humility he really requires what poetry and art cannot provide, to see it in its constant process of becoming.

Romantic love lends itself to representation in the moment; not so married love I can represent a hero conquering kingdoms; but a cross-bearer who everyday takes up his cross can never be represented, because the point of it is that he does it everyday.

The development of the aesthetically beautiful and the perfecting of art depends on art's being able to free itself from space and to define itself in temporal terms.

Music has time as its element but poetry is the most complete of all arts which knows best how to justice to the significance of time.

But it has its limits, and cannot represent something whose very truth is temporal succession. But if aesthetic remains incommensurable even with poetic representation, how can it be represented?

Answer: by being lived. With this I have reached the highest in aesthetic Married love, has its enemy in time, its victory in time, and its eternity in time Faithful, humble, patient, observant, persistent, willing All these virtues have the property of being inward specifications of the individual.

II: In the soul three things control actions; sensation, intellect and appetite. Since moral virtue involves choice, and choice is deliberate appetite then, if the choice is to be good, the reasoning behind it must be true and the desire right.

The origin of action is choice, and the origin of choice is appetite and purposive reasoning. But no process is set going by mere thought- only by practical thought.

Anyone who makes anything makes if for a purpose relative to a particular end. But action is an end in itself, and man is the causative union of reason and appetite.

No past event is an object of choice; hence, Agathon was right to say: One thing is denied even to God To undo what has been already done III: To look further back, we can say that there are five ways in which the soul arrives at truth by affirmation or denial; by art, science, prudence, wisdom and intuition.

Judgement and opinion need not be included as they can often err. Science aims at knowledge of the eternal and is supposed to be teachable.

But all teaching starts from what is known either by induction of first principles or by deduction from those first principles.

This is our description of scientific knowledge. IV: Art, or craft skill, is concerned with bringing something into existence, the cause of which is reasoned in the producer not the product.

Since production is different to action, art is not concerned with action but has an element of chance, as Agathon says: Art loves chance, and chance loves art.

V: To understand prudence, or practical wisdom, we may consider what type of person we call prudent. A prudent man is able to deliberate rightly, not just about particular things like health, but about the good life generally.

As prudence is not a fixed thing, then it cannot be a science. It does not aim at production, so it is not an art.

Prudence, then, is a virtue, and one which is of the calculative, reasoning part of the soul. But it is not merely a rational state, for such can be forgotten while prudence cannot.

VI: Let us consider intuition. All science comes from certain first principles, so it follows that those principles cannot themselves be comprehended by science, or by art, or prudence or even by wisdom.

The state of mind which apprehends first principles is intuition. VII: When we call Phidias a wise sculptor or Polyclitus a wise portraitist we mean that they have artistic wisdom.

But some people are not wise 'at something' but wise without any qualification. Wisdom, therefore, seems the most finished form of knowledge.

Wisdom is scientific and intuitive knowledge of what is by nature most precious. That is why a wise person can often be more effective in action than one with specialist knowledge.

VIII: Prudence and political science are the same state of mind, but they are realised differently. The man who knows and provides for his own interests is called prudent, but politicians are considered meddling busybodies.

However, it is impossible to secure one's own good without a sound political structure around you. Prudence is not science, as we have said, because it apprehends the last step, while intuition apprehends the first definitions.

IX: We must try to grasp the nature of deliberation, for it is not the same thing as enquiry. Neither is it conjecture, for that is a rapid thing while deliberation takes some time.

It is true that one who deliberates badly makes errors, but a wicked person can deliberate well to achieve an evil end. So good deliberation is that which succeeds in relation to a particular end.

X: There is also understanding, which is not the same as scientific knowledge or opinion. Nor is it like prudence, which deals of what one should or should not do.

Understanding only makes judgements, for there is no difference between good and bad understanding. XI: What is called judgement is the faculty of judging correctly what is equitable.

And equitable judgement is sympathetic judgement. All these states of mind naturally tend to converge so that we call a person understanding, prudent or intelligent more or less indifferently.

We should, however, give more attention to the opinions of older, more experienced people, even without demonstrations of fact, because age brings with it intuitive reason and judgement.

XII: What is the use of the intellectual virtues? They are concerned with the just and the admirable and the good, but knowing them does not mean that they are put into practice.

Just as it is possible to know medicine or physical training without practising it. First, wisdom and prudence, being virtues, must be desirable in themselves, even without any result.

Next, they do, in fact, produce a result- wisdom is a virtue which makes a person happy by the possession of it.

We ought also to consider cleverness, which is the ability to achieve an aim. The aim can be noble or base, which is why we may call both prudent and unscrupulous people clever.

Prudence is not quite the same, for insight cannot lead to prudence without some virtue. XIII: We must now reconsider virtue.

If we have a disposition towards justice or temperance or courage, then we have it from our birth, but moral qualities are acquired.

Some people, including Socrates, claimed that all the virtues are forms of prudence. But we must go further and say that virtue is not merely a state conforming to the right principle, but one that is inseparable from it.

At the same time, prudence does not use wisdom, but allows it to be realised. To say otherwise would be like saying that the State controls the gods because it directs rituals.

I: There are three states of character to be avoided: vice, incontinence and brutishness. The contrary of vice is virtue and of incontinence is continence.

The opposite of brutishness is something like superhuman virtue, as Homer says of Hector:. But as divinity is rare among men, so is true brutishness, though it is commonest among non-Greeks.

We must now discuss incontinence, effeminacy and endurance. II: Socrates said that nobody consciously acts against what is best, other than through ignorance.

This is inconsistent with the evidence, for we see that men often act out of the impulse of desire and against their knowledge and judgement.

Again, the sophists trap people by knotty arguments into believing what is good is bad. III: We must consider whether incontinent people act knowingly or unknowingly- whether the incontinent man is so because of his circumstances or his attitude.

Firstly, for a man to do wrong without reflecting on his own knowledge is very different from acting with that knowledge.

Secondly, there are two types of practical knowledge that act as the starting-point to actions. These are the universal and the particular premises.

The universal is knowledge about things and the particular is knowledge about how they should be acted upon. But a man may know both without drawing the correct conclusion.

For instance, he might know that "savoury food is more wholesome than sweet" and also "wholesome food should be eaten" but he may not put the two together and actually choose to eat savoury foods.

Thirdly, we may assume that incontinent people are like those asleep, or drunk, or mentally disturbed or in the grip of temper or sexual craving, who speak and act without knowledge.

Fourth, even if a man knows both the universal and particular premises his natural desires may sway his scientific judgement. IV: Is anyone absolutely incontinent, or only in certain respects?

It is obvious that continence or incontinence are concerned with pleasures and pains. Now, certain pleasures, such as food and sex, are necessary, others, like victory or honour or wealth are merely desirable.

Those who are incontinent in the second type we do not call simply incontinent, but add "in respect of money" or some other qualification.

People are not blamed for liking them, only for doing so to excess, like those who pursue some good end in the wrong way, like Satyrus' excessive infatuation with his father.

V: Some things are not naturally pleasant, but can become so through injury, habit or congenital depravity.

And for each unnatural pleasure there is an abnormal state of character. There is the brutish character, as in those tribes around the Black Sea who eat human flesh.

Also, morbid states, like nail-biting or homosexuality, may come naturally to some people, or may have been acquired by habit, for instance if someone has been sexually misused as a child.

Where nature is the cause, we do not blame people as incontinent. But those congenitally incapable of reason we call brutish, and those troubled by illness we call morbid.

VI: Let us consider if incontinence of temper, which is anger, is different to incontinence of desire. Unlike desire, temper seems to have some reason to it, but to, as it were, listen imperfectly- like the over-eager servant who rushes off before his master has finished giving instruction.

When reason informs someone that they are being insulted, temper sees such a person as an enemy.

It is partly pardonable to be guided by the natural appetites we all share. But incontinence of desire is a vice, for it is led by pleasure. We do not condemn the brutes as intemperate or licentious because they possess neither choice nor calculation.

So, though brutishness is frightening it carries no corruption of the highest reasoning. A bad man can do much more harm than a brute.

VII: We have noted that some pleasures are necessary, but only up to a point. The man who pursues excessive pleasures is licentious, because he is unrepentant.

On the other hand, the man deficient in the appreciation of pleasures is the opposite of licentious, while the temperate man is between the two.

The difference is between those who yield from choice and those who do not. Anyone would think worse of someone who thrashed another having thought about it carefully, than of someone who acted in a moment of passion.

The man who fails to endure everyday pains is soft and effeminate, unless his weakness is due to some congenital defect, like the hereditary effeminacy of Scythian aristocrats.

The lover of amusement is also thought licentious, but he is really soft, for amusement is excessive indulgence in relaxation.

VIII: In general vice is unconscious, incontinence is not. So incontinence is not vice and the incontinent are not wicked, though they do wicked things.

The incontinent man is one who is impelled by his feelings to deviate from the right principle, but is not so completely mastered as to pursue such pleasures unrestrainedly.

IX: We must ask whether virtue consists of abiding by any choice or principle, or only by following the right one. Some people cling doggedly to their opinion, whom we call obstinate.

They can be divided into the opinionated, the ignorant and the boorish. The opinionated are motivated by pleasure and pain and enjoy a sense of superiority.

Thus they resemble the incontinent. The incontinent and the licentious man both pursue bodily pleasures, but the first thinks it is wrong while the second does not.

X: The prudent man is morally good. But simply knowing what is right does not make a man prudent, he must be inclined to actually do it,.

The incontinent man is not so disposed. He is like a State which has good laws, but fails to implement them, while the bad man is like a State that actually does implement its bad laws.

XI: So is pleasure good? Some say that pleasure is not a good because it hinders thinking. Others that some pleasures are disgraceful or harmful, and others that pleasure cannot be the supreme good because it is not an end but a process.

XII: This does not prove that pleasure is not a good. I Things are called good either absolutely, or good for somebody. II A good may be an activity or a condition.

III The argument that there must be something better than pleasure because the end is better than the process is not conclusive because pleasures are a species of activity, and therefore an end.

The argument that pleasures are bad because some pleasant things are injurious is no better than saying that healthy things are bad because some of them are bad for the pocket.

But, clearly, the pleasures of brutes and children are not good. XIII: Pain is clearly an evil to be avoided. Now, the opposite of pain is pleasure, so it must be good.

When Speusippus argued that good is contrary to both pleasure and pain, he cannot be correct, for he refused to allow that pleasure is an evil.

Different people may pursue different pleasures, but it is always pleasure which they pursue. XIV: Those who think that some noble pleasures are highly desirable, but bodily pleasures are not, ought to consider why, in that case, the pains which are contrary to them are bad, for the contrary of a bad thing is a good one.

Everyone enjoys tasty food and wine and sex to some degree, but not everyone to the right degree. With pain, it is the opposite.

The bad man shuns, not just excessive pain, but all pain. Now, pleasure drives out pain. But it is not possible for the same thing always to give pleasure for our nature contains different elements which are rarely in balance.

Only God could enjoy one simple pleasure forever. I: Friendship is a kind of virtue, or implies virtue. It is necessary for living, for nobody would choose to live without friends.

When we are young, friends keep us from mistakes. When we are old they care for us. In the prime of life, they encourage us.

Friendship is the bond that holds communities together. Some say with Empedocles that 'like is drawn to like', others with Heraclitus that 'opposition unites'.

But these matters can wait. II: It might help if we could define what an object of affection is. Is it the good that people love, or only what is good for them?

These sometimes conflict. We do not speak of friendship about our affection for inanimate objects, because there is no return of affection.

It would be absurd for a man to wish for the good of his wine. III: There are three kinds of friendship. Some, especially the old or the ambitious, love from utility, to derive benefit from the friendship.

Sometimes such people do not even like each other, as with friendship with foreigners. Those who love on the grounds of pleasure are motivated by their own pleasure.

This is commonest among the young and with erotic friendship. Such can rise and fall very quickly. Only the friendship of those who are similarly truly good is perfect, but it is rare, as good man are rare.

IV: With friendship for the sake of pleasure, as beauty wanes, so often the friendship wanes too. Pleasure or utility friendship is possible between two bad men, but obviously only good men can be friends for their own sakes.

V: Friends who spend their time together confer mutual benefit. When they are asleep or apart, they retain the disposition to do so.

But if the absence long it often makes men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight, out of mind'. VI: Friendship arises less readily among sour and elderly people.

Young men become friends much more quickly and easily than older men, although the latter may still be well-disposed toward others. On the other hand, to have many perfect friends is no more possible than to be in love with many people at once, for love is a kind of excess of friendship.

VII: Another kind of friendship involves superiority, as the affection of father for son, husband for wife or master for servant. In such cases, affection is proportionate to merit; the better person must be loved more than he loves.

There is a great gulf in the form of affection between ordinary people and gods or royalty. This raises a problem as to whether friends do actually wish each other the greatest of goods, ie to be a god, because they will no longer have them as friends.

It seems, then, that a friend will wish for the best for a human being, but presumably will reserve the very best of these for himself.

VIII: Most people seem to want to be loved rather than to love. For honour is men's confirmation of their own opinion of themselves.

But people enjoy being loved for its own sake, so it may be supposed that being loved is better than being honoured.

Friendship seems to consist more in giving than in receiving affection, as we see in the joy that mothers show in loving their children. A friendship of utility occurs between unequals, such as the poor and the rich, or the ignorant and the scholarly man, but only inasmuch as each can get something in return.

We might add here the sort of lovers who make themselves look ridiculous by demanding to be loved as much as they love.

This may be connected with the attraction of difference, but it is irrelevant to our enquiry. IX: There is some similarity, as we have said, between friendship and justice, as is seen in the wider community.

The whole State community, we presume, was originally formed for mutual advantage, just as sailors join together to run the ship or businessmen to make money, or soldiers look to plunder or conquest.

X: There are three kinds of political constitution, and an equal number of perversions of them. Monarchy is the best form, but can degenerate into tyranny when the ruler begins to pursue his own interests above those of his subjects.

Aristocracy can degenerate into rule according to property ownership, which we call timocracy, where corrupt officials share the resources of the state.

Timocracy itself can disintegrate into democracy, which is not nearly so bad. There are analogies in the household, where the relationship of fathers and sons is a sort of monarchy, though the way in which Persians treat their sons more resembles tyranny.

The association of husband and wife is clearly aristocratic, while of brothers is like to timocracy. Democracy is like a household with a weak head so that everyone can do as they wish.

XI: In each of these political constitutions there is a sort of friendship to the same extent as there is justice. There is the friendship of a king for his subjects.

There is the friendship between brothers, like the timocracy which unites the members of a social club. In perverted constitutions, where there is nothing in common between ruler and ruled, friendship and justice are rarely found.

XII: Friendship between relatives appears to be derived from parental affection. Parents love their children from the moment of birth, but children only come to understand this later.

Hence mothers love their children more than fathers do. This love of children for parents, or of men for the gods, implies a relation to an object superior to oneself.

Friendship between brothers is not unlike that between comrades, while friendly feelings between other relations are proportionate to the closeness of the relationship.

Man is by his nature a pairing rather than a social creature and the family is an older and more necessary thing than the state. Humans cohabit not merely to produce children, but, as the functions of husband and wife are different they supply each other's deficiencies to secure the necessities of life.

Children, too, form a bond between parents, which is why childless marriages so often break up. XIII: Quarrels occur most of all in friendships based on usefulness because each is only using the other for his own benefit, but in friendships based on virtue, quarrels are rare because the friends are eager to treat each other well.

XIV: In friendships based on superiority quarrels often arise because the person who is superior thinks he should receive more by virtue of his superiority, and the one who is inferior thinks he should receive more because of his greater need.

This is especially true of honours paid to parents or to the gods. So much for our discussion. Aristotle of Stagira Nicomachean Ethics Squashed down to read in about 60 minutes "If it is in our power to act nobly, it is also in our power to do evil.

Like this? No Time? Aristotle of Stagira, cBC Nicomachean Ethics "If it is in our power to act nobly, it is also in our power to do evil.

Happiness is an activity of the soul according to virtue. TWO: For every virtue there is a vice, so we can say that virtue is a state of character, gained by rational choice, lying in a middle way relative to the man.

Confidence is the mean between rashness and cowardice. Liberality lies between prodigality and meanness, honour between vanity and undue humility.

Decision making relates to the ends, choice to the means. FOUR: Proper pride is praiseworthy, but he who claims greatness, being unworthy, is vain.

Good temper is the mean with respect to anger. The man who is angry at the right things, is praiseworthy. FIVE: Justice is largely concerned with goods.

Justice is either proportionate, or rectificatory, where something is taken from the greater to give to the less. SIX: Prudence, or practical wisdom, is a virtue of the calculative, reasoning part of the soul.

Science depends on first principles, which are found from intuition. Wisdom is knowledge of what is by nature most precious.

Anger is a natural appetite all creatures share. The man who pursues excessive pleasures is licentious.

Amusement is excessive indulgence in relaxation. Simply knowing what is right does not make a man prudent, he must be inclined to actually do it.

Some love from utility, to obtain what they wish, others from pleasure. True friendship is rare, as good men are rare.

NINE: In friendships, there is equitable exchange. But if friends want different things, all fails. Concord is more a political feeling, where citizens put their common resolves into effect.

It is not possible to find many worthy friends, so we must be content with a few. TEN: If true happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it must be in accordance with the highest virtue, which is philosophical contemplation.

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